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The Financial Crisis and the Measurement of Financial Sector Activity 
Charles Steindel 
New Jersey Department of the Treasury 
Abstract 
The widespread expectation, forcefully posed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), that growth in the U.S. and 
the rest of the industrialized world will be subpar for a prolonged period following the financial crisis, 
raises issues for the measurement of the financial sector’s activity.  According to the U.S. NIPA, finance 
and insurance accounts for roughly 8 percent of GDP, much of which consists of routine processing of 
transactions and maintenance of accounts.  As noted in Steindel (2009), by normal growth accounting 
reasoning, even a marked contraction in the sector’s activity would not seem likely to be capable by 
itself to have a major prolonged negative impact on growth.   One possible alternate way to account for 
the activity of the sector, building on the work of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009), is that the 
very high levels of employee compensation in finance partly reflect investments in market knowledge, a 
form of intangible capital.  The increased growth in such market knowledge in the years leading up to 
the crisis may have helped to support growth in the economy outside of finance, while its diminution in 
the current environment (if not offset by increased growth of comparable knowledge elsewhere) could 
work to hold down growth.  Altering the treatment of finance in the accounts in this fashion helps to 
bridge, if not fully close, the gap between the absolute size of the sector as gauged in the standard way 
and its generally acknowledged large and persistent effect on aggregate activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks to Carol Corrado and Daniel Sichel for comments, and Josiah Bethard for assistance. This paper 
was written when the author was employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the views 
expressed here are those of the author only and not necessarily those of the State of New Jersey, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System.    
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 The financial crisis has spurred interest in examining the interaction of the financial sector and 
the real economy.  Much of this recent work has focused on how shocks, such as unexpectedly low 
payoffs on investments, are transmitted through the economy, and the options stabilization policy may 
have to offset such effects (e.g. Woodford and Curdia, 2010).  In general, this line of research augments 
New Keynesian models with the addition of financial intermediary sectors that channel funds from 
savers to entrepreneurs who produce final output.  Decompositions of this type add a variety of interest 
rates to the models.  The relative movements in these rates may be informative about the 
macroeconomic outlook and could potentially be an input to stabilization policy, for instance by setting 
criteria for government purchases of private securities as an adjunct to the Central Bank’s targeting the 
overnight risk-free interest rate.  
 It is not clear, though, that financial sectors modeled in such ways provide much insight into the 
longer- term evolution of the economy in response to a financial crisis, given that the underlying models 
were developed primarily to understand business cycle dynamics.   Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) (as well 
as Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010) document that nations that have experienced significant financial crises 
have typically seen prolonged periods of subpar output and employment growth.  Of course, this record 
may reflect demand-side effects—it may just be the case that a large shock to aggregate demand from a 
financial crisis is only partly offset by forces such as expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.1
                                                          
1 Also, a long and deep recession may depress potential (and actual) output by suppressing the growth of physical 
and human capital. 
   
However, it is possible that major financial contractions directly depress aggregate activity for a long 
time, either because the financial sector itself is of sufficient magnitude so that a slump there will weigh 
down national totals (assuming that the process of re-allocating resources from finance to growth 
sectors is cumbersome), or because finance provides substantial volumes of critical products to  other 
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sectors, and a blockage in this flow leads to a significant and prolonged impairment in efficiency 
throughout the economy. 
 This paper will examine the potential that a contraction in U.S. finance has to impinge aggregate 
output, looking at both the direct effects of a diminution in the size of the sector, and at potential 
spillovers to the rest of the economy.  Steindel (2090) found that in the data used in the National 
Income and Product Accounts, substantial, sustained contractions in both finance and real estate do not 
appear to, by themselves, be capable of accounting for very large and prolonged slowdowns in activity.  
This paper re-examines those findings in the wake of updated data.  Furthermore, taking into account 
the work of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009) on the role of intangible investments in U.S. 
economic growth, a modified estimate of financial sector activity is discussed.  This measure assumes 
that the unusually large compensation received by workers in the financial sector (documented by 
Phillipon and Reshef, 2009) may be a proxy for investment in market knowledge.  The resulting 
augmentation of financial investment appears capable of accounting for a meaningful proportion—on 
the order of one-third—of the brisk trend growth rate of multifactor productivity (MFP) in the sector in 
the last generation.  This allows for a more systematic estimation of the potential direct aggregate 
impact of a contraction in finance.  
The Financial Sector in the Aggregate Data 
 Finance and Insurance in the National Accounts encompasses four major industry groups:  1. 
Financial intermediaries (“Federal Reserve Banks, credit intermediation, and related activities”).  2.  
Securities dealers (“Securities, commodity contracts, and investments”).  3.  Insurance (“Insurance 
carriers and related activities”).  4.  Financial advisors and money management (“Funds, trusts, and 
other financial vehicles”).2
                                                          
2 These are the major sectors and names in the NAICS.  The SIC classification was broadly similar. 
  The sector can be seen as adding value to current production by payments 
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processing, safekeeping, risk-bearing, and advising investors and borrowers.  The sector is assumed to 
provide final services to household investors and foreign customers; businesses and governments are 
purchasers of intermediate services.   
A large part of the services provided to households are “imputed”--households earn below 
market returns on large portions of the funds held on deposit at institutions such as commercial banks, 
and the presumption in national accounting is that they are earning and consuming implicit services in 
return for the sacrifice of income.3
 The precise computation of these imputed services is an unsettled matter (Triplett and 
Bosworth, 2004).  In the U.S. accounts, the assumption is that the entire explicit interest margin of 
depository institutions is paid out as imputed interest.  The “reference rate,” measured as the yield on 
the industry’s U.S. Treasury debt portfolio, determines the split between imputed interest paid to 
depositors and that paid to borrowers.  The difference between the actual interest paid to depositors 
and the amount they would have earned if their deposits had accrued at the reference rate is defined to 
be imputed interest paid to depositors.  The difference between interest paid by borrowers and the 
amount they would have paid if they borrowed at the reference rate provides the estimate of imputed 
interest paid to borrowers, which is assumed to reflect services provided to borrowers in return for their 
paying above-Treasury rates on the loans. 
  Borrowers are also assumed to be receiving imputed services when 
they pay above-market rates for their funding.  The receipt of such imputed services by nonfinancial 
businesses reduces the output of the nonfinancial business sector by the amount that financial output is 
increased, and overall GDP is unaffected.  The consumption of imputed services by depositors is a 
component of GDP (Fixler, Reinsdorf, and Smith, 2003). 
                                                          
3 Households are also credited with imputed income and consumption from funds left as insurance reserves and 
from mutual fund holdings, though the computation of these differ from those credited for deposits at 
intermediaries.   
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 Clearly, the computation of these imputed interest flows is rather arbitrary.  One particular issue 
is the use of the rate of return on banks’ holdings of Treasuries as the reference rate to calculate 
imputed interest paid to borrowers.  Obviously, few if any private borrowers can obtain financing at the 
Treasury rate.  Arguably, at the margin, borrowers can be seen as deciding between liquidating funds 
earning the reference rate and paying higher market rates.  Thus the spread between borrowing rates 
and the reference rate can be said to reflect the implicit costs of services provided by banks to 
borrowers (Fixler, Reinsdorf, and Smith, 2003).  Others have argued that a higher interest rate, taking 
into account  the inherent risk in lending to private parties, should be used as the reference rate to 
compute imputed interest paid to borrowers (Wang, Basu, and Fernald, 2009; Basu, Inklaar, and Wang, 
2010).  If such a procedure were adopted the dollar value of imputed interest paid to business 
borrowers by the financial sector would be reduced, as would be reported financial output.  A slightly 
contrasting view arises from the observation that the payment of imputed interest is assumed to cease 
when a loan is sold by a depository to a nondepository—for instance, when a loan is purchased for 
securitization (Ashcraft and Steindel, 2008).  Because, from the borrower’s viewpoint, nothing 
substantive has changed in the servicing of the loan, the disappearance of its imputed interest flow 
appears hard to justify.  Recognition that imputed interest continues to flow to such borrowers would 
have the effect of increasing the dollar value of imputed interest paid to borrowers and would shift the 
composition of industry output toward financial firms.4
 These issues connected to the computation of imputed interest paid to borrowers bear on the 
calculation of current-dollar financial output.  A whole host of other questions relate to the computation 
of the real output of the sector, given the immense difficulties defining standardized transactions.  For 
instance, even a very simple transaction, such as the purchase and sale of corporate stock, raises some 
 
                                                          
4  Any explicit fees the purchaser of the loan pays to the originator will be reflected in measured financial sector 
output. 
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complexity in determining the real activity involved.  Is the unit of transaction a single sale of a block of 
shares, or the sale of one share?  It certainly seems as if the sale of 10 shares in one block involves no 
more physical services than a sale of 1 share (especially if the nominal values of the transactions were 
equal and involved the same ownership stake in a firm); however, the sale of multiple shares may also 
involve transactions with multiple buyers.  Such conundrums could multiply exponentially when one 
attempts to deflate the expenses involved with the creation of securitization structures or those 
associated with M&A activity.  We are left with the issue that there are serious concerns associated with 
the computation of current-dollar financial sector output, and likely even greater ones involving the 
calculation of real output.  Many would have associated more intensive use of financial services in 
recent years with efficiency gains in user industries and across the economy as a whole (Kohn, 2008), 
given the subsequent contraction one might argue that either the measures of past usage and the 
efficiency gains were overstated, or that lessened use in the future will weigh down growth. 
 Turning from the conceptual issues to the published numbers, Table 1 shows the breakdown of 
financial sector gross revenues in 2008 based on the categories value-added, services purchased by final 
users, and intermediate services provided to other industries   Over half the revenues of the financial 
sector were intermediate services provided to other industries (these include sales to other industries 
within the sector).  The bulk of the final sales of the sector are services (including interest paid to 
depositors) provided to households. 
 The numbers shown do not incorporate the July 30, 2010 revision of the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA).  The revised figures show somewhat higher 2008 household purchases of 
financial services than was earlier reported.  Revisions of the numbers on the sector’s value-added and 
gross revenues have not yet been released.  However, there was a very substantial downward revision 
in  domestic financial sector profits for 2008 (from $271.6 billion to $128.0 billion), as well as a 
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comparable cut in the estimate of national income for the broader finance, insurance, and real estate 
sector.  These suggest that there will be a reduction in the estimate of the finance and insurance sector’s 
value added, equal to perhaps one percentage point of GDP. 
        
Table 1 
2008 Value-Added and Gross Output of Finance and Insurance 
  
      Billions of Dollars  Percent of GDP 
Value-Added             1200.0          8.3 
Gross Output             2169.3 
Sales to Final Users              861.6          6.0  
 Consumption              832.0          5.8    
  Imputed Interest            271.4          1.9  
  Insurance services5
Intermediate services sold            1207.7  
            252.7                       1.7  
 Sales within the sector             487.9 
Intermediate services sold to nonfinancial sectors        720.8 
 
Data on sales to final users, the consumption aggregate and intermediate sales within the sector come 
from the BEA annual input-output table on industry make/use. 
 
 The likelihood of this downward revision to financial value-added would seem to support 
arguments that U.S. output has been overstated due to overestimates of the contribution of finance—
estimates of overall U.S. GDP, both nominal and real, for 2008 were also reduced.  However, it appears 
that any downward revision to value-added produced by finance and insurance will reflect some 
                                                          
5 Essentially life and medical insurance premiums less benefits received. 
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combination of reduced estimates of intermediate services sold to other sectors, or larger estimates of 
purchases from other sectors (there were no consequential revisions to the numbers on household 
consumption of financial services).  Other things equal, revisions of this type would increase estimates of 
value-added outside of finance, offsetting the reduction in financial value-added (indeed, estimates of 
2008 corporate profits outside of domestic finance have been boosted).   
  In any event, the value-added and final sales data do not by themselves suggest that finance 
and insurance looms as a remarkably large sector.   Moreover, as we see, these numbers are notably 
boosted by imputations.  The significant volume of imputations assigned to financial activity allows for 
clearer understanding of the large figures for profits in the sector.  Most importantly, if finance was not 
assumed to be providing services to depositors (and insurance policy holders and mutual fund 
customers) equal to its spread income, the NIPA data would show that much of its profits would be 
offset by much lower figures for net interest paid, leaving the sector smaller and, probably, more stable.  
Economic cycles are generally accompanied by large swings in the balance sheet of the financial sector, 
and the current treatment allows for these swings (which are generally accompanied by shifts in spread 
income) to appear in the aggregate data. 
 It is hard to trace in the reported numbers some of the mechanisms through which the financial 
sector may be of critical importance for the business cycle and longer-term growth, in particular.   As 
noted, the bulk of the final financial services purchased are fairly commonplace products used by the 
household sector, the demand for which is likely slowly-evolving with longer-term trends.  Income 
earned by the sector from sales of intermediate services could very well be held down in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis; in other words, industries outside of finance may use fewer financial services, and it 
is possible that reduced use of these intermediate inputs could hold back activity throughout the 
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economy.6
The numbers reported by BEA show that, all in all, sales of financial services—both final and 
intermediate—amounted to only a bit more than 8% of aggregate gross revenues in 2008, even after 
years of steady growth in this share, while the ratio of financial gross revenues (BEA’s term is gross 
output) to GDP was approximately 15% (Chart 1).  This latter ratio is of particular importance, since one 
way to examine how a financial sector contraction could impact longer term growth is to look at how 
the sector’s contribution to MFP growth might diminish, and the contribution of a single sector’s MFP 
growth to that of the economy at large is proportional to the ratio of its nominal gross revenues to 
nominal GDP (Schreyer, 2001).  Thus, using the BEA numbers, it would require a roughly 6 percentage 
point reduction in the growth of MFP in finance to reduce the growth of aggregate MFP by 1 point.
    If gross revenues of the financial sector loom large for the economy as a whole this 
mechanism could go a good way to understand why financial crises are associated with significant 
retrenchments in aggregate activity.   
7
                                                          
6 This is a “supply-side” effect of a financial contraction, stemming from higher costs or less efficient provision of 
financial services leading to suboptimal usage.  This is opposed to the “demand-side” effects stemming from forces 
such as loss of access to financial services stemming from declines in wealth among users of financial products.  
Estimates of the loss of output from a financial contraction that concentrate of movements in the industry’s value-
added, such as those shown in Berrera, Estaveo, and Keim (2009), appear to incorporate both sets of effects.   
   
7 One might maintain that indirect “spillovers” from a financial contraction to other sectors would amplify its 
effect, meaning that not such a drastic financial contraction would be required to generate a 1 percentage point 
reduction in aggregate MFP growth.  However, the spillovers in question would be from technical progress in 
finance to that in other sectors, which is hard to understand.  Other arguments have been advanced that the 
aggregate impact of financial shocks is amplified through accelerator mechanisms; current work in 
macroeconomics is extensively devoted to examining such accelerators.  These mechanisms, though, are 
essentially those that propagate cyclical disturbances through spillovers to demand.  In model calibrations these 
effects can be long-lasting, but such results come in part from attempts to match a model to the historic aggregate 
record. 
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The BEA gross revenue figures reported may overstate the importance of finance and insurance 
sector, since they do not net out sales between industries in the three-digit sectors included.   The 
comparable figures available from BLS show substantially lower financial and insurance revenues; using 
the BLS figures a much larger reduction (up to 10 percentage points) in MFP growth in finance and 
insurance would be required to reduced the growth of aggregate MFP by 1 percentage point.   We now 
turn to the BLS data to examine recent MFP trends in the financial sector. 
Harper, Khandrika, Kinoshita, and Rosenthal (HKKR, 2010) report estimates that MFP in 
securities grew at a compound rate of 7.2% from 1987 to 2006 (Table 2).  This was far and away the 
highest pace for the 42 nonmanufacturing sectors they examined.  While MFP growth in the securities 
sector cooled off slightly after 2000, it still averaged a hefty 6.3% from 2000 to 2006. 
HKKR find that MFP growth in other components of finance and insurance was noticeably less 
than in securities, with their longer-term averages slightly negative.  Still, there was  a noticeable step-
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up after 2000 in two of the other three areas, with that for banking rising from -2.1% for 1987-2000 to 
3.1% for 2000-2006, and that for trusts moving up from  -1.0% to 0.0%.  Countering a portion of these 
increases was a slowing in MFP growth in insurance. 
HKKR calculate that the broad finance and insurance sector contributed .31 percentage points to 
average aggregate MFP growth of 1.50% in 2000-20006.  This was a bit smaller than the contribution of 
retail and wholesale trade; however, the trade contribution changed little after 2000 while that from 
finance and insurance moved up from an average of .19 percentage point in 1987-2000. 
The lower portion of Table 2 recalculates the HKKR estimates for the finance and insurance 
sector using the revised data available on the BLS website (http://www.bls.gov/mfp/mprdload.htm).  
The new numbers show an approximately .1 percentage point reduction in the growth contribution 
from the sector for the years 2000-2006 from that reported by HKKR.  Nevertheless, the new numbers 
still suggest that the finance and insurance sector made a major contribution to MFP growth in the first 
half of the last decade, with an absolute rate of growth of nearly 2 percent a year in that period. 
 
Table 2 
Multifactor Productivity Growth and Contributions 
 
     1987-2006 1987-2000 2000-2006 2007  
 
Derived from Harper, Khandrika, Kinoshita,  
And Rosenthal (2010) 
 
Growth (compound annual rate) 
Private Business     1.04    0.83    1.50 
Finance and Insurance             
  Banking      -.03   -2.1     3.7                
  Securities      7.2    7.7      6.3 
   Insurance      -.6      .4    -2.5 
   Trusts       -.7   -1.0       .0  
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Average Growth Contributions 
Finance and Insurance      .17     .10      .31     
  Banking      -.01    -.10      .18                
  Securities       .21     .20      .21 
  Insurance      -.02     .01    -.08 
  Trusts       -.01    -.01      .00 
 
Based on Revised Industry MFP data 
 
Growth (compound annual rate) 
 Finance and Insurance     1.2      .9     2.0  -1.0  
  Banking      -.8   -2.0     2.1  -4.7              
  Securities      7.6    8.3      6.0     1.1 
   Insurance      -.2      .2      -.9    2.6  
   Trusts      -1.0    -.6      1.9                -1.6  
 
Average Growth Contributions 
Finance and Insurance      .12     .09       .20    -.11   
  Banking     -.02   -.07       .09    -.20              
  Securities       .15    .15       .15      .03 
   Insurance       .0    .0      -.01      .08 
   Trusts      -.01   -.01     - .02     -.02 
 
 
 
If MFP growth in finance and insurance was to go into reverse and decline at the same rate as its 
growth rate from 2000-2006, the effect, using the HKKR estimates, would be that the sector would 
swing from contributing about one-third of one percentage point to annual aggregate MFP growth to 
holding down aggregate MFP growth by that amount.  Such a downshift—amounting to two-thirds of 
one percent -- would be at least reminiscent of the growth costs of financial crises documented in 
Reinhart and Rogoff and Reinhart and Reinhart (Reinhart and Reinhart estimate that annual real GDP 
growth rates in large nations have fallen about one percentage point for the decade following a financial 
crisis).  The revised numbers suggest that reversing the sign of the 2000-2006 growth in MFP in finance 
and insurance could be associated with aggregate MFP growth slowing close to one-half percentage 
point relative to its 2000-2006 trend  
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A major problem with pro-forma computations of this type is that one should have some insight 
into the forces that might be associated with such swings in MFP growth in a sector.  Clearly, at least in 
the securities component, the MFP growth trend has been extraordinary:  the HKKR estimate is that the 
level of MFP in the securities industry increased four-fold in the twenty years after 1987—a period 
shorter than the careers of some professional athletes.8
The other  major sectors that have stood out as making major positive contributions to 
aggregate MFP growth in the last generation are trade (wholesale and retail) and, in manufacturing, 
computers and electronics.
 
9
Of course, similar forces have likely been at work in finance and insurance.  However, in 
technology manufacturing and in trade, it is plausible to assume that, over time, the impetus to MFP 
growth will fade without further rapid advances in technology.  It appears to be more difficult to sketch 
a scenario in which MFP would decline, without anticipating that some other forces would be at work.  
Similarly, it would be hard to understand a projection in which MFP in finance and insurance would 
retrogress for a sustained period without getting a handle on the forces that have propelled its long-
term surge and assessing the likelihood of their reversal. 
   In these sectors, there are reasonably well-accepted explanations for the 
surges (Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2008).   Essentially, advances in information technology (both in the 
production and use of the hardware and software tools), and, especially in trade, fundamental 
organizational changes allowing exploitation of the economies of scale achievable by the technology, 
can be seen as underlying the rapid growth in MFP.  Looking into the specifics of these industries, 
analysis of the effects of spending on intangible assets, such as R&D, training, staff reorganization, 
advertising and other branding expenses, could provide a fuller understanding of their MFP movements. 
                                                          
8 Roger Clemens’ major league career spanned 1984-2007 and Greg Maddux’s 1986-2008.  Julio Franco’s first 
major-league game was in 1982 and his last was in 2007, but he did not play in the major leagues in 1995 and 
1998. 
9 HKKR note that accelerated MFP in broadcasting also contributed to the pickup in aggregate MFP growth after 
2000. 
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Intangible Investment and MFP Growth in Finance and Insurance 
 One approach to the issue of understanding some of the factors behind rapid growth in financial 
MFP might come from rethinking how the inputs to activity of the financial sector are measured.  
Basically, finance is currently viewed as combining conventionally-measured capital and labor inputs (as 
well as intermediate products purchased from other sectors) to produce its services and earn its income.  
Measured in this fashion, it is hard to understand some of the extraordinary returns earned by factors of 
production in finance.  Many observers have noted the high return to capital in the sector, signaling out 
the very high share of corporate profits accruing to finance (Chart 2). 10
 
  Looking a bit more broadly, in 
2006, the peak year for financial profits, capital-type income in the sector (profits, net interest, and 
proprietors’ income) was about $450 billion.  The estimated current-dollar replacement cost of all 
physical capital owned by the sector was $1103 billion at the start of that year; thus capital income 
amounted to a remarkable 40.7% of the start of year value of physical capital.  Capital income in all 
private domestic industries in that year equaled 10.8% of the start of year value of all fixed reproducible 
assets.  The substantial gap between finance and other sectors has persisted for some time, and may be 
difficult to relate solely to the riskiness of finance (Chart 3).  On the labor side, Philippon and Reshef 
(2010) have noted that compensation per worker in finance in 2006 was approximately 30% to 50% 
greater than the compensation received by workers of comparable education and technical skills in 
other industries.  This differential was not evident in the early 1980s. 
                                                          
10 As mentioned, the 2010 NIPA revisions sharply reduced recent estimates of financial sector profits.  Still, even 
after these reductions, pre-tax operating profits in finance during the trough year of 2008 amounted to 15% or all 
domestic corporate earnings. 
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PhilIppon and Reshef assigned this unexplained compensation differential in finance to “rents.”  
Comparably, HKKR could only conclude that the surge in MFP in the securities sector “could be reflective 
of an overheated financial market.”  Given the very large size and persistence of these differentials it 
seems reasonable to assume that some ongoing special factors must help to explain the high rates of 
return to capital and labor.  If so, and if it seems plausible that such factors could diminish in the future, 
a large diminution in the sector’s MFP (as would be conventionally measured) would be easier to 
understand. 
 Attempts to understand movements in national output trends that cannot be readily explained 
by shifts in capital and labor inputs—swings in aggregate MFP—often focus on examination of the inputs 
of intangible assets.  Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009) have done a comprehensive assessment 
of the possible aggregate importance of accounting for intangible investments in R&D, brand 
enhancement (items such as advertising) and the like, in a similar matter as tangible investment, rather 
than as intermediate expenditures.  In this alternative treatment, the capital stock is expanded by the 
addition of a large amount of (fairly rapidly depreciating) items, and GDP is swelled by investment in 
them.  Their finding is what is reported as acceleration in national MFP can be partly explained as the 
result of rapid growth of the productive inputs from these intangible capital types.  Their bottom line 
result is that the published .94 percentage point increase in aggregate MFP growth from  1973-1995 to 
1995-2003 is reduced to .67 percentage point when spending on these intangible items is accounted for 
as investment, rather than as outlays for intermediate product. 
 If we apply the Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel methodology to finance the results would likely be 
fairly lackluster, taking into account the most obvious types of intangible capital.  For instance, as 
reported in Wolfe (2010), less than 2% of aggregate commercial R&D spending in the U.S. in 2005 was 
incurred by firms in the finance and insurance sector ($3 billion out of a total of $226.2 billion, or .5% of 
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sales, compared to an economy-wide average of 3.7%).   Can there be other types of intangible capital 
more germane to financial activity? 
 An obvious example would appear to be the information financial firms have about their 
customers and markets.  Clearly, a successful firm would have very specialized knowledge about the 
evaluation of credit and the various institutional and regulatory structures associated with financial 
transactions in different markets and jurisdictions.  Of course, firms in other industries need some 
knowledge of this type—a fisherman has to know what species are most desired, assess where the 
schools are gathered, and when and where the buyers can be found—but arguably information on 
market structure is of peculiar importance for finance, especially given the extraordinary expansion in 
the complexity, size, and number of markets and instruments over the last generation.  Such 
information would be highly proprietary, and one would not expect it to be reflected clearly in items 
such as spending on formal R&D or even technology capital. 
 A plausible proxy for capital spending by financial firms on market knowledge may lie in the 
compensation numbers.  Potentially, some fraction of the compensation paid by financial firms reflects 
payments for the specialized market knowledge of the workers in the industry; such knowledge may not 
be easily connected to either their formal skills (as measured by factors such as their educational 
achievement) or even their years of experience.  As a first pass, it will be assumed that increases in 
aggregate compensation in finance and insurance that are associated with increases in the 
compensation per full-time equivalent employee in finance relative to workers in “professional, 
scientific and technical services” reflects increased spending on market knowledge.  The professional, 
scientific, and technical services sector encompasses legal services, computer services, and 
miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services (industries such as accounting, advertising, 
and consulting), and the presumption is that the formal technical qualifications of workers in these 
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industries are comparable to those in finance.  Unfortunately, the NAICS numbers on professional, 
scientific, and technical services are only available for the years 1998-2008; for 1987 to 1998 a 
reasonable benchmark SIC sector consists of legal and other services, while prior to 1987 the benchmark 
comprises legal and other professional services.   
Chart 4 shows movements in the ratio of financial compensation per full time equivalent (FTE) 
worker to those of the benchmark series, with the 1969 value of the ratio set equal to one.  The sharp 
increase in relative compensation in finance starting in the late-1980s is quite evident and appears 
comparable to the excess wage series computed by Philippon and Reshef (as shown in their Figure 11).  
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The hypothesis  is that spending by financial firms on traditional labor services can be 
approximated by outlays sufficient to maintain the ratio of their compensation per FTE to that of 
professional, scientific, and professional services equal to mid-1980s levels—in other words, presumably 
the labor component of compensation per worker reflecting payments for standard labor services has 
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increased at the same rate in finance and insurance as in other industries hiring labor of comparable 
technical and professional skills.11  All compensation spending in excess of this mark will be viewed as 
outlays by finance in an intangible asset, market knowledge capital.  It will be further assumed, in line 
with the assumptions made by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, that this investment is valued at the same 
price as that for all nonfarm business, and that such investment depreciates at a 50% annual rate.  It will 
also be assumed that the aggregate stock of this capital was zero at the end of 1987.12
 Chart 5 shows the effects of this computation for the growth of the capital stock of the financial 
sector.   With the assignment of “excess” compensation as a type of investment, and the assumptions 
on depreciation, the augmented finance and insurance capital stock increases by roughly 3 ¼ times from 
1987 to 2008, compared to the officially reported increase of about 2 ½ times.
  
13
                                                          
11 There is a noticeable difference in the 1998-2000 overlap period between the NAICS numbers on compensation 
per full time equivalent worker in professional and other services and the SIC numbers on compensation per 
worker in legal and other services, with the levels of the SIC levels being substantially higher.   
  The compound annual 
growth rate of the augmented capital stock is 5.8%, compared to the official figure of 4.7%.  Thus, 
viewing excess compensation as investment results in a fairly noticeably augmentation to the growth of 
the finance and insurance capital stock. 
12 The computation adjusts for the difference in numbers of full time equivalent workers in finance and insurance 
between the SIC and NAICS measures in 1998-2000.  The NAICS numbers are about 94.5% the magnitude of the SIC 
figures in the overlap years, and only this proportion of the SIC figures on aggregate compensation in finance and 
insurance in 1985-1997 is used in the computation. 
13 For the purposes of the aggregation it is assumed that the deflator for the end of year values for the new capital 
type is the average of the deflator for nonfarm business output for the current and next year. 
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The assignment of excess compensation in finance to spending on intangible knowledge capital 
would have a further number of further significant implications for the accounting of activity in the 
sector: 
1.  Estimates of profits in the sector would be boosted, because the excess compensation 
would no longer be charged as an immediate expense.   The boost to profits would, though, 
be muted by a depreciation charge on the new type of capital. 
2. The production of the new type of capital would need to be accounted for.  A plausible way 
to do this would be to assume that the new capital is the product of labor in a new 
“industry.”  This industry could plausibly be part of the broader finance and insurance sector 
(this treatment is analogous to BEA’s “own-account” construction series—structures built by 
households and staffs of nonconstruction firms and governments). 
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As the result of such adjustments, the finance and insurance sector would represent a larger 
fraction of GDP and aggregate gross revenues for the period since 1987, and at least for part of that 
time, would be reported to grow faster than is currently the case.  There would also be a small upward 
adjustment to overall GDP.  Table 3 illustrates the impact of the addition of this investment series upon 
the growth of real value-added for finance and insurance, upon the growth of real gross output (both 
the BEA and BLS measures), and upon real GDP.  It is clear that the impact on real GDP growth is 
minimal, but there is a modest upward effect upon the various measures of financial sector growth. 
 
Table 3 
1987-2006 Growth of GDP and Financial Gross Output Before and After Recomputation 
(Chained $2005, Compound Annual Rate) 
GDP 
 Before     3.1% 
 After     3.1% 
Finance and Insurance Value-Added 
 Before     4.0% 
 After     4.4% 
Finance and Insurance Gross Output:  BEA Estimate 
 Before     4.6% 
 After     4.8% 
Finance and Insurance Gross Output:  BLS Estimate 
 Before     3.7% 
 After     4.1% 
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 The key point, though, is not the impact of the reclassified compensation on GDP or on 
measures of financial activity.   As noted above, the major point of interest is to see how the 
reclassification may affect MFP growth in finance and ultimately that in the economy at large.  The 
difference between the new and altered estimates of MFP growth in the sector would be charged to the 
reclassification of a portion of compensation.  One may make more or less defensible suppositions as to 
the future evolution of financial sector compensation; in turn these will affect the growth trajectory of 
the market knowledge capital variable and will thus influence the growth of observed MFP in the sector 
as well as that for the economy as a whole.    
The main elements needed for the impact of accounting for this new type of capital on sectoral 
MFP growth are the already computed alternate growth rates of real gross revenues in finance and 
insurance (for this exercise, the numbers on the new type of capital spending are added to these the BLS 
estimates), the already computed estimate of the growth rate of real intangible capital, and the user 
cost of that intangible capital.  It will be assumed, for simplicity, that the user cost on the new type of 
intangible capital will be based on applying a fixed 54% rate of return to the nominal start of year stock 
of that capital (the rate of return would likely be expected to be in excess of 50% given the depreciation 
assumption).14
Table 4 shows the results of the recomputation of finance and insurance MFP growth made by 
including the new input.  The essential point is that there are noticeable reductions.  The new estimate 
for average MFP growth in finance and insurance from 1987 to 2000 is .5%, compared to the .9% 
  With the assignment of user costs to the new capital (equal, at its peak, to 
approximately 10% of the gross revenues of the sector), the growth contributions from already 
accounted for labor, capital, and intermediate inputs will be pared (since their income shares will be 
reduced). 
                                                          
14 This is clearly a highly arbitrary assumption, in part because it does not assume equilibration of rates of return 
across investment types.  This simplification is likely adequate for the purpose of illustrating the potential effect on 
finance and insurance MFP of capitalizing “excess” compensation. 
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computed from the official BLS data.  For 2000-20006, the new estimate is growth averaging 1.5% a 
year, compared to 2.0%.  For the entire period from 1987 to 2006 the new estimate is .8%, compared to 
1.2%.  In other words, by these computations something around one-third or more of reported MFP 
growth in finance and insurance over the last generation could reflect a lack of accounting for the 
creation of intangible capital suggested by the very high relative compensation of the sector.   
 
Table 4 
Finance and Insurance MFP Growth Before and After Recomputation 
(Compound Annual Rate) 
 
1987-2006 1987-2000 2000-2006 2007 
Before       1.2        .9      2.0  -1.0 
After         .8        .5      1.5  -1.4 
 
This recomputation of MFP growth in finance and insurance might allow for a clearer 
understanding of recent and perspective movements in the published series, and, other things equal, 
the contribution of finance and insurance to aggregate MFP movements.  One possibility is to view the 
0.5% trend from 1987 to 2000 in the transformed series as a plausible estimate of “true” MFP growth in 
the sector.15
1.  “Underlying” MFP growth of .5% a year. 
   Under this assumption, the rapid reported 2% trend in finance and insurance MFP from 
2000 to 2006 may be parsed into three components: 
                                                          
15 This estimate itself would likely be trimmed somewhat if one recognized the growth contributions of the types 
of intangible investments discussed by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel.  However, some fraction of these are, in 
principle, already recognized as intermediate purchased service inputs to the industry’s output in BLS’s KLEMS 
system, so any increment would stem from the contributions of past expenditures.  Given the high depreciation 
rate assumptions for these types of investment the increment to input growth would probably be rather limited. 
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2. A .5% contribution from the growth of market knowledge capital proxied by the high dollar 
volume and growth of “excess” compensation in the sector. 
3. A residual of 1% that may reflect rents stemming from the rapid growth in activity in the 
sector in this period. 
Intangible Investment and Possible Future Growth Contributions of Finance 
If we look to the future, it is certainly plausible to suppose, at one extreme, that both the 
second and third components noted above could turn negative if financial sector expansion slows, and 
the compensation bill falls back to being more characteristic of sectors employing workers of 
comparable skills (through some combination of pared growth or declines in relative compensation per 
worker, and slower growth of or reductions in employment).   Given a “baseline” for MFP growth in the 
sector of .5% per year, a period of negative reported MFP growth for finance and insurance may be 
plausible.  In turn, a swing from 2% a year reported MFP growth for finance and insurance to a negative 
value would imply downward pressure on aggregate MFP of at least one-quarter percentage point a 
year.  To reiterate, if there is an unwinding of high compensation in the sector, and that high 
compensation truly is a proxy for investment in a productive form of intangible capital, the downward 
push on published MFP would stem in part from declines in that type of capital.  
The ultimate extent of the downward pressure on aggregate MFP from an unwinding of high 
compensation in finance and real estate would be uncertain.  In 2008 the computed user cost of this 
intangible capital stock equaled about 1 ¼% of GDP.  Thus, the disappearance of this type of capital (in 
other words, relative wages in finance reverting to their mid-1980s levels) would apparently reduce the 
level of MFP by about this amount, which is, of course, not by itself sufficient to amount to more than 
either a brief sharp interruption to the growth of the aggregate series, or to a period of several years of 
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growth under par.16
In addition to the mechanisms that have been discussed, another channel by which economic 
output may be held back (on the supply side) in the aftermath of the financial crisis is from its impact on 
the services received from the  housing stock.  The depressed levels of homebuilding in recent years 
have greatly reduced the growth of the housing stock, and real imputed income from owner-occupied 
housing is now reported in the NIPA as basically unchanged, as compared to a trend rate of growth of 
over 3% through the middle of the last decade.  Owners imputed rental income is equal to about 7% of 
nominal GDP.  Thus, this slowdown in imputed rent has by itself  worked to put downward pressure on 
real GDP growth in excess of 0.2 percentage point a year. 
  In other words, a very prolonged drag on growth from the supply side stemming 
from a financial contraction might seem somewhat unlikely.   However, that conclusion depends on 
reliance on the fairly problematic computations of the level of the stock of intangible capital and its user 
cost. 
Adding together the decline in the trend in imputed rental income, as well as the hypothesized 
impact of a potential slowdown in the growth contribution from intangible finance capital, produces 
estimates of possible downward pressures on real output growth from the supply side on the order of 
0.5 percentage point a year, with roughly equal contributions from the two sources.17
                                                          
16 This fraction is about equal to the lower bound of the range of losses to potential GDP following a financial crisis 
estimated by Furceri and Mourougane (2009).  
  This total effect 
still appears to be considerably smaller—and likely shorter-lived--than the post-crisis growth slowdowns 
described in Reinhart and Rogoff and Reinhart and Reinhart.  However, it does appear that some 
understanding of the roots of these slowdowns can be found by reconsideration of the sources of 
growth of financial activity. 
17 This estimate is somewhat higher than that shown in Steindel (2009), in part reflecting a higher estimate of the 
drag from reduced owners’ equivalent rent and in part reflecting a refined estimate of a slowdown finance and 
insurance.  It is broadly comparable, as noted, to that reported by Furceri and Mourougane (2009)—putting their 
level estimates in terms of near-term growth—as well as OECD (2009) 
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Conclusions:  Limitations and Future Work 
The critical elements of this analysis have been the measurement of excess compensation paid 
by the financial sector, identification of that excess with investment in an intangible asset, and assessing 
the user costs of that assets.  All of these assumptions may be questioned:  
1.  Professional and other business services may not be the best benchmarks to gauge financial 
compensation per employee.   
2. Identifying excess relative compensation with absolute nominal investment in an asset is 
problematic. Suppose, for instance, compensation per employee were declining relative to that in the 
private economy at large in both finance and insurance and business and professional services, but the 
decline was larger in business and professional services.  Would it then be reasonable to identify the 
increase in finance and insurance compensation relative to that in the benchmark as a sign of positive, 
purposeful, intangible investment? 
3.  As noted, the user cost calculation used in the exercise was quite arbitrary. 
Future work in this area could address these and other issues, and refine the estimated impact 
on MFP.  Nonetheless, the calculations present here suggest that thinking about high compensation in 
finance as, in part, a form of investment has the potential to improve our understanding about some of 
the growth of this sector.  
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